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Abstract
 
This paper investigates the investment behaviour of a large panel of Hungarian
firms in the period 1989–99, in order to assess the impact of institutional and
regulatory changes on the efficiency of credit allocation. We find that the role of
financial factors for investment decisions has changed significantly after the intro-
duction of major financial reforms, and that firms were affected differently depending
on their ownership type. Reforms have hardened the budget constraint of private
domestic firms, particularly small ones, and reduced informational problems for
foreign-owned firms. State-owned firms remained subject to a soft budget constraint.
In particular, small state firms became more sensitive to financial conditions,
whereas large state firms were unaffected and kept operating under a soft budget
constraint.
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1. Introduction
 
One of the key issues in the transition process of formerly centrally planned econ-
omies is the establishment of a functioning financial system that allows an efficient
allocation of credit. This requires designing institutions and rules to impose financial
discipline on firms that in the old system were subject to a soft budget constraint,
due to the fact that loss-making firms could rely on external assistance by means
of direct subsidies, favourable tax conditions, or bail-out credits.
 
1
 
In the past two decades, the Hungarian financial system has undergone a number
of major changes in order to increase its efficiency (see, for example, Halpern and
Wyplosz, 1998, and Stephan, 1999). In particular, the banking sector reform was
aimed at the separation of central banking and commercial banking functions, the
restructuring of commercial banks and the definition of an appropriate regulatory
framework. At the same time, the introduction of a new bankruptcy law was
intended to enhance allocative efficiency and to provide agents with the appropriate
incentives.
Institutional reforms 
 
per se
 
, however, are not a sufficient condition for the
achievement of an efficient credit allocation system. Once the new rules are created,
agents must learn to play by the rules. In particular, in transition economies, lenders
have to develop project appraisal and monitoring skills, while borrowers must
learn to respond appropriately to the new system of incentives. Whether the reform
process in transition economies has succeeded in establishing an efficient incentive-
based financial system is an open and much-debated issue (for the Hungarian
economy, see, for example, Bonin and Schaffer, 1995, 2002; Colombo and Driffill,
2003; Halpern and Körösi, 2001).
The objective of this paper is to examine whether reforms to the Hungarian
financial system have been successful in increasing its efficiency. We investigate
the investment behaviour of a large panel of Hungarian manufacturing and
construction firms between 1989 and 1999, and examine whether the institutional and
regulatory changes have succeeded in imposing a hard budget constraint, an issue
that has been recently addressed by a number of studies for different transition
economies (see, for example, Bratkowski 
 
et al.
 
, 2000; Budina 
 
et al.
 
, 2000; Lízal and
Svejnar, 2002; Maurel, 2001; Schaffer, 1998; Sgard, 2001; Volchova, 2003).
Our study makes a number of contributions to the existing literature. First, it is
the first analysis of the role of financial factors for investment decisions in the
Hungarian economy based on a large and representative firm-level panel dataset
(the sample covers about 80 percent of total employment and value added of the
 
1
 
 Under a soft budget constraint, ‘[ . . . ] the financial position of the state-owned firm is not without
influence. Although there is a budget constraint that forces some financial discipline on the firm, it is not
strictly binding, but can be “stretched” at the will of the higher authorities. In principle, the firm should
cover expenditures from revenues made on the market. In practice, earnings from the market can be arbitrarily
supplemented by external assistance.’ Kornai (2000, p. 25). See also Kornai (1980, 1986).
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Hungarian manufacturing sector). Second, the long time period covered by our
dataset (1989 to 1999) allows us to compare firms’ investment behaviour 
 
before
 
 and
 
after
 
 the introduction of major financial reforms. We can therefore provide evidence
not only on the extent to which firms face a soft budget constraint, but also on
whether financial system reforms have affected the degree of rationing or softness
of the budget constraint. Third, we provide evidence on investment behaviour by
ownership type, analysing individually state-owned, private domestic and foreign-
owned firms. Fourth, we use firm size and solvency to check the interpretation of
the observed relationship between investment and liquidity indicators. Finally,
we explicitly deal with firms’ unobserved heterogeneity, estimating investment
equations in first differences with a GMM estimator that exploits optimally the
moment conditions available for each time period under the assumption of serially
uncorrelated errors.
The main findings of the analysis can be summarized as follows. The role of
financial factors for investment decisions has changed significantly after the intro-
duction of major financial reforms, and firms were affected differently depending
on their ownership type. In the post-reform period, small private firms came to
face binding financial constraints, whereas state firms kept facing a soft budget
constraint, although the investment decisions of small state firms became more
sensitive to financial conditions. Foreign-owned firms were subject to a hard budget
constraint in both periods, but became less sensitive to financial conditions after
1993, possibly indicating that reforms have been successful in lowering informa-
tional costs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes
the theoretical background, discussing the role of financial factors and informa-
tional asymmetries for investment decisions, and the different roles they play in
market and transition economies. Section 3 reviews the main steps of the reform
of the Hungarian financial system. Sections 4 and 5 describe the econometric
methodology and the dataset, while Section 6 presents the results of the empirical
analysis. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the main findings of the analysis.
 
2. Credit rationing, soft budget constraints and investment 
decisions
 
Following Modigliani and Miller (1958), neoclassical theoretical analyses of the
determinants of investment decisions generally abstracted from the role of firms’
financial positions. More recently, however, the economics of asymmetric informa-
tion has provided solid microeconomic foundations for the role of financial factors
in determining investment levels. In the presence of informational asymmetries,
the availability of internal funds allows firms to undertake investment projects
without resorting to high-cost external finance. In addition, stronger balance sheet
positions lower the cost of external finance. Firms’ net worth positions therefore
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determine their capacity to obtain external funds and, as a consequence, their
investment and production levels.
 
2
 
At the empirical level, the evidence on the role of financial constraints for
investment decisions can be traced back to the original work of Fazzari 
 
et al.
 
 (1988),
who showed that the sensitivity of investment spending to financial positions is
higher for firms 
 
a priori
 
 considered likely to be credit constrained. Subsequent
studies have generally confirmed such findings, extending the analysis along several
dimensions.
 
3
 
 In this literature, a positive and significant relationship between
investment and indicators of liquidity is taken as evidence that firms are credit
constrained, whereas perfect capital markets would imply no such relation as
internal and external financing would be perfect substitutes.
A similar approach has been followed to investigate the sensitivity of invest-
ment decisions to financial positions in transition economies. However, in contrast
to market economies, in transition economies the absence of a positive and signif-
icant relationship between investment and financial indicators is not likely to
indicate perfect capital markets: it rather suggests that firms are subject to a soft budget
constraint, because they have access to external finance irrespective of their pro-
fitability. In other words, whereas in estimating cash flow-augmented investment
equations for market economies the null hypothesis is perfect capital markets, in
the case of formerly planned economies the null hypothesis is the presence of a soft
budget constraint.
This approach has been followed in a number of recent papers that investigate
investment decisions in transition economies. Lízal and Svejnar (2002) analyse
firms’ investment decisions in the Czech Republic between 1992 and 1998, finding
that cooperatives and small firms are credit rationed, whereas large state-owned
and private firms operate under a soft budget constraint. Budina 
 
et al.
 
 (2000), who
examine the role of liquidity constraints for investment decisions of Bulgarian
manufacturing firms in the 1993–95 period, find that size and financial structure
help to determine the extent to which firms are credit constrained and that soft
budget constraints continue to play a major role.
 
4
 
2
 
 See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) and Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). Other important theoretical works on the financial propagation mechanism include Calomiris and
Hubbard (1990) and Gertler (1992).
 
3
 
 A number of articles have considered different datasets for the United States (Calomiris and Hubbard
1995), countries other than the United States (Blundell 
 
et al.
 
, 1992; Chirinko and Schaller 1995; Devereux and
Schiantarelli 1990; Hoshi 
 
et al.
 
, 1991), alternative sample split criteria to identify credit constrained firms
(Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992; Whited, 1992), and alternative model specifications (Bond and Meghir, 1994;
Hubbard 
 
et al.
 
, 1995). See also Hayashi and Inoue (1991) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994).
 
4
 
 Among related studies, Volchova (2003) estimates an accelerator model for Russian industrial firms in 1996
and 1997, finding that firms in unregistered groups invest a larger proportion of their retained earnings
relative to the rest of the economy, whereas Bratkowski 
 
et al.
 
 (2000), examine survey data for Czech,
Hungarian and Polish newly established private firms to assess the presence of credit constraints, and
conclude that imperfections in capital markets do not seem to restrain the growth of new private firms.
 Investment Decisions and the Soft Budget Constraint
 
175
For the Hungarian economy, to our knowledge, there is no firm-level study of
investment decisions based on a large panel dataset, with the only exception of
Maurel (2001), who analyses company accounts between 1992 and 1998, and
finds that credit rationing applies to all categories of firms (foreign-, private- and
domestically-owned). The focus of that study, however, is on the role of investment
in improving the technical efficiency of firms, as measured by total factor
productivity. Another work based on a large panel of Hungarian firms is the one
by Sgard (2001), who adds to the large body of literature on foreign direct investment,
finding that between 1992 and 1999 foreign equity is associated with higher
productivity levels and substantial positive spillover effects on aggregate TFP
growth. More recently, Perotti and Vesnaver (2004) investigate the financing
of investment in a sample of 56 listed Hungarian firms between 1992 and 1998,
finding evidence of significant financial constraints with the exception of foreign-
owned firms.
 
5
 
Against this background, our study contributes to the existing literature on
investment decisions in transition economies not only by filling the gap for the
Hungarian economy, but also by exploiting the richness of our firm-level dataset
to explicitly address the efficiency effect of financial sector reforms on state,
private, and foreign enterprises. To this purpose, before presenting the results of
the empirical analysis, the next section briefly reviews the recent transformation of
the Hungarian financial sector, examining in particular the banking sector reform
and the bankruptcy law.
 
3. Financial sector reform in Hungary
 
One of the key elements of the reform of the Hungarian financial system was the
restructuring of the banking sector. A two-tier banking system had already been
established in Hungary in 1987, when three state-owned banks had taken over
commercial functions from the National Bank of Hungary, which retained central
banking functions. Under the planned system, the monobank did not operate
on the basis of profit considerations, and its portfolio included a high share of
non-performing loans, which were inherited by the newly established commercial
banks. After 1990, new commercial banks entered the market, even though foreign
participation remained relatively low until 1994. The average quality of the loans
portfolio remained low, due to both the absence of an appropriate regulatory
 
5
 
 Other important related studies for the Hungarian economy include Bonin and Schaffer (1995), who
provide an assessment of the banking and bankruptcy reforms on the basis of a survey of 200 manufacturing
firms, and Halpern and Körösi (2001), who estimate frontier production functions to investigate the impact
of competition on the efficiency of the corporate sector. More recently, Colombo (2001) and Csermely and
Vincze (2003) examine the determinants of the capital structure of Hungarian firms, finding evidence of
imperfections that constrain firms in the achievement of their optimal capital structure.
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framework to enforce prudential lending practices, and the lack of expertise by
bank managers, which often resulted in bad lending decisions. The interplay of
these factors resulted in a series of banking crises in the early 1990s. The reaction
of the Hungarian authorities was twofold: a program of bank consolidation was
started in 1992, and a strict bankruptcy law was enacted to enforce hard budget
constraints on firms.
The consolidation programme foresaw first recapitalization and then privatiza-
tion of existing banks. As a result of recapitalization, the fraction of bad loans
started to decrease in 1994, and it has steadily declined thereafter, reaching levels
comparable to those of Western economies. The privatization of banks took off
between 1994 and 1995 with the government selling strategic shares to foreign
banks and other foreign investors. Over the period 1994–2000, direct state ownership
fell from 65 percent to less than 20 percent, whereas the share of foreign-owned
banks rose from 20 to 80 percent (see Abel and Bonin, 2000).
It is commonly agreed that the banking sector reform in Hungary has been to
a large extent successful in establishing an efficient system of independent and
financially strong commercial banks (see, for example, Halpern and Wyplosz, 1998,
and Stephan, 1999). A key factor of success was the outward orientation of the
reform, with foreign banks being allowed not only to become shareholders
of domestic institutions, but also to establish their own subsidiaries. The presence
of foreign ownership had positive spillover effects, increasing competition in the
sector and introducing innovative technologies and higher quality banking services.
More advanced banking skills enabled foreign firms to screen and monitor loans
more efficiently, contributing significantly to the reduction of bad loans.
The new bankruptcy law was the second pillar of the legislative shock therapy
implemented in 1992. It established two possible tracks, liquidation and reorgani-
zation, both of which allowed for the continuation of the firm after restructuring.
 
6
 
In addition, it imposed an automatic trigger that required a firm to file for reorgan-
ization if it was unable to repay any debt to any creditor within 90 days of the debt
becoming due. The motivation for the strictness of the bankruptcy law and for the
automatic trigger was the Hungarian authorities’ concern about two main problems:
creditor passivity and soft budget constraints.
The bankruptcy code was therefore engineered with the primary objective of
improving the state of payments discipline and hardening budget constraints,
particularly through the limitation of inter-enterprise debt arrears. Nevertheless,
as observed by several authors, (see, for example, Bonin and Schaffer, 2002), the
severity and strictness of the bankruptcy law was probably excessive, as it repre-
sented one of the major causes of the credit crunch that hit the Hungarian economy
 
6
 
 Despite the difference in the denomination of the two tracks, in both cases the firm was given the oppor-
tunity to reorganize and restructure. The actual difference was that, under the reorganization track, control
remained with the incumbent management while reorganization took place, whereas under the liquidation
track, control was transferred to liquidators.
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in 1992–93.
 
7
 
 As a consequence, the bankruptcy law was amended in late 1993, one
of the most important changes being the abolition of the automatic trigger. Despite
these changes, the reforms implemented in 1992–93 provided Hungary with one of
the strictest banking and bankruptcy regimes in Eastern Europe.
 
4. Methodology
 
The relevance of financial factors for corporate investment decisions is commonly
investigated by adding financial indicators, such as cash flow, to empirical specifi-
cations derived from a real investment model. The estimated coefficients for the
financial indicators are interpreted as a measure of the sensitivity of investment to
financial constraints. In this study we estimate an accelerator model of investment
demand (see Appendix 2 for details):
(1)
where 
 
I
 
 denotes gross investment, measured as the change in the level of net fixed
assets plus depreciation, 
 
K
 
 is capital stock (net fixed assets), 
 
Y
 
 indicates net sales,
as a proxy for output, and 
 
ε
 
i
 
,
 
t
 
 = 
 
α
 
i
 
 + 
 
γ
 
i
 
 + 
 
η
 
i
 
,
 
t
 
, with 
 
α
 
i
 
 representing firm-specific effects,
 
γ
 
i
 
 time-specific effects, and 
 
η
 
i
 
,
 
t
 
 the idiosyncratic component of the error term.
This specification, known as the modified accelerator model, is based on the
level of sales, rather than the change in sales as in the traditional accelerator model.
Theoretically, the modified accelerator can be derived from a standard neoclassical
model with ‘putty clay’ capital (Oliner 
 
et al.
 
, 1993), or from an accelerator model
with delivery and installation lags (Abel and Blanchard, 1988). Empirically, it
has been used, among others, by Fazzari 
 
et al.
 
 (1988), Vermeulen (2002) and, for
transition economies, Lízal and Svejnar (2002). Oliner 
 
et al.
 
 (1995), using quarterly
data for the aggregate business sector in the United States, find that the modified
accelerator outperforms the traditional accelerator model both in sample and out
of sample.
Equation (1) reflects firms’ investment demand and implicitly assumes perfectly
elastic credit supply or, in the case of a transition economy, a soft budget constraint.
In order to account for the possibility that firms face constraints in obtaining external
financing, we augment the basic equation with lagged values of cash flow (see, for
example, Fazzari 
 
et al.
 
, 1988 and Bond 
 
et al.
 
, 2003):
 
7
 
 Moreover, the emphasis on payment discipline created several distortions: as pointed out by Mitchell
(1998) and Bonin and Schaffer (2002), the automatic trigger was not based on a measure of insolvency, but
rather on a measure of illiquidity. As a consequence, even profitable and viable firms would be forced to
enter reorganization if they had overdue payables, independently of their amount.
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(2)
where cash flow is measured by adding depreciation to profits after interest, tax
and preference dividends.
The use of investment/cash flow sensitivities to assess the role of financing
constraints has been widely debated (see, for example, Fazzari 
 
et al.
 
, 2000; Kaplan
and Zingales, 1997, 2000). In particular, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that
investment/cash flow sensitivities do not increase monotonically with the degree
of financing constraints, and that most of the 
 
a priori
 
 sorting criteria used in the
literature to identify financially constrained firms are theoretically ambiguous. Our
approach is not subject to this criticism, given that we focus on the comparison of
investment/cash flow sensitivities in the pre-reform and post-reform periods. The
sorting criterion is temporal, so that we do not split the cross-sectional distribution of
firms, but compare the role of cash flow in different periods for all firms in the sample.
It is also important to observe that, as discussed in Section 2, when testing the
significance of cash flow for the investment levels of domestic firms in a transition
economy, the null hypothesis is the presence of a soft budget constraint: the absence
of a significant relationship between investment and cash flow is likely to indicate
that firms are subject to a soft budget constraint, since they have access to external
finance irrespective of their profitability.
In estimating Equation (2), the presence of the lagged dependent variable,
which is correlated with the firm-specific component of the error term, implies that
the OLS estimator is inconsistent even if the idiosyncratic component of the error
term is serially uncorrelated. The 
 
within
 
 transformation, although eliminating
the fixed effects, does not solve the problem, as it introduces correlation between
the lagged dependent variable and the time averaged idiosyncratic error term (the
same problem would apply to the random effect-GLS estimator).
An alternative solution for the correlation with the fixed effects is to first difference
the data. The effect of differencing, however, is not only to eliminate the individual
effects, but also to produce a first-order moving average error term. This, in turn,
introduces correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the differenced
error term, thus posing the problem of the selection of the appropriate instruments.
To solve this problem, we follow the approach suggested by Arellano and Bond
(1991) who developed a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that
uses lagged levels of variables as instruments.
The GMM estimator optimally exploits all the moment conditions specified
by the model. More lagged instruments become available for the differenced
equations as we consider later cross-sections of the panel.
 
8
 
 As the number of valid
 
8
 
 Very remote lags are unlikely to be informative instruments, and hence we did not use all available
moment restrictions, but instruments dated 
 
t
 
 
 
−
 
 2 to 
 
t
 
 
 
−
 
 6. All the results reported are qualitatively robust to
the choice of the instrument set.
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instruments depends on the serial correlation of the idiosyncratic component of the
error term, it is essential to verify the assumption of serially uncorrelated errors.
To this purpose, we report the 
 
m
 
1
 
 and 
 
m
 
2
 
 statistics, which test for first- and second-
order serial correlation in the residuals.
 
9
 
 We also report 
 
p
 
-values for the Sargan test
of over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 
 
χ
 
2
 
 under the null of
instrument validity, where 
 
k
 
 is the number of over-identifying restrictions.
 
10
 
 We
report one-step coefficient estimates, and test statistics based on heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors (see Arellano and Bond, 1991).
 
5. Data
 
The analysis presented in this paper is based on a large dataset of about 18,000
Hungarian firms from 1989 to 1999 (see Appendix 1 for details). The dataset contains
information on balance sheet and income statement items, employment, export,
ownership, regional location and industry classification at the four-digit level. From
the original dataset we selected companies whose main activity was in the manu-
facturing and construction sectors. The resulting sample represents about 80
percent and 35 percent of total employment in the Hungarian manufacturing and
construction sectors, respectively.
 
11
 
Information about the distribution of equity ownership allows us to identify
separately state-owned, private domestic and foreign firms. State and private firms
were classified by majority ownership or, in the absence of an absolute majority
stake, by relative majority. Foreign firms were defined as firms with more than
25 percent of capital owned by foreign firms. Firms with changing ownership over
time were assigned to the ownership type they belonged to for the largest span of
the sample.
 
12
 
We applied a number of checks to account for possible data inconsistencies.
First, we eliminated companies with illogical figures, such as negative sales, capital
 
9
 
 Both statistics are asymptotically distributed as standard normal under the null of no serial correlation. If
the assumption of no autocorrelation for the errors in levels is correct, so that second order lags of variables
are valid instruments, the null hypothesis should be rejected for 
 
m
 
1
 
 (because of the negative autocorrelation
induced by first-differencing) but not for 
 
m
 
2
 
.
 
10
 
 We also report the 
 
z
 
1
 
 statistic, a Wald test of joint significance of the reported coefficients (asymptotically
distributed as a  under the null of no relationship, where 
 
k
 
 is the number of coefficients tested), and the
 
z
 
2
 
 and 
 
z
 
3
 
 statistics, performing Wald tests of the joint significance of the coefficients of the time and industry
dummies, respectively. Estimation was carried out using the 
 
dpd
 
 program (Arellano and Bond, 1988) with
 
gauss
 
 version 5.5.
 
11
 
 In terms of value added, the firms in the sample represent about 81 and 34 percent of the total Hungarian
manufacturing and construction sectors, respectively.
 
12
 
 It should be noted that this assignment procedure did not have a significant impact on the definition of
ownership types, given that 75 percent of the firms did not change ownership, and 20 percent of the firms
changed ownership type in only one or two years over the 11-year sample period.
χk2
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or employment. After computing the main variables, we also eliminated companies
for which any of the variables of interest (investment, sales, cash flow) fell below
the 2.5th percentile or above the 97.5th percentile of its distribution.
 
13
 
 We then
excluded companies with incomplete (discontinuous) time series and required that
at least four consecutive annual observations on each of the main variables were
available for the firms included in the final sample. These criteria left us with an
unbalanced panel of 4,333 firms for a total of about 25,000 observations between
1989 and 1999.
Table 1 reports median values for the main variables used in the investment
equations (investment, sales and cash flow relative to capital, and leverage and
employment) for the overall sample, and grouping firms according to sample period
(pre- and post-1993), size, and leverage.14 For comparative purposes, Tables 2 to 4
present the same statistics by ownership type: state-owned, private domestic and
foreign-owned companies, representing about 41, 39, and 20 percent of the whole
sample, respectively.
Comparing the overall median values by ownership type, investment and cash
flow are lowest in state-owned firms (0.10 and 0.15) and highest in foreign-owned
firms (0.24 and 0.25). A similar pattern also applies to leverage (0.41 and 0.46 for
state- and foreign-owned firms, respectively). The sales–capital ratio is highest for
private domestic firms (5.23) and lowest for foreign firms (3.20). Finally, private
domestic firms are generally smaller (the median employment is 71 against 80 for
the whole sample).
13 This check was necessary to control for the presence of outliers and the occurrence of major mergers or
acquisitions. All the results were qualitatively robust to the choice of the trimming threshold.
14 Small firms are defined as those whose employment is below the median value of the distribution for the
whole sample. Low/high leverage firms are defined as those whose debt–asset ratio is below/above the
median value for the whole sample.
Table 1. Median values by subsample
Sample I /K Y /K CF/K D/A E No. of obs.
Overall 0.15 4.32 0.20 0.43 79.64 25,202
1989–93 0.10 4.34 0.16 0.40 65.50 9,568
1994–99 0.18 4.30 0.23 0.44 86.50 15,634
Small firms 0.19 5.79 0.27 0.47 44.13 12,607
Large firms 0.13 3.50 0.16 0.39 184.57 12,595
Low leverage 0.11 3.40 0.20 0.27 91.43 12,606
High leverage 0.22 5.76 0.21 0.62 69.59 12,596
Note : See Section 5 for details on data sources and definitions of variables. I = investment; K = capital; Y =
sales; CF = cash flow; D = total debt; A = total assets; E = employment.
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Focusing on subsamples within groups, investment, cash flow and leverage rise
substantially in the 1994–99 subperiod, and this rise is particularly evident for
private domestic firms. Small firms are characterized by higher median values for
all the indicators, both in the overall sample and by ownership type. The disaggre-
gation by leverage indicates that high-debt firms are characterized by higher
investment and sales, and lower employment levels.
6. Results
Our empirical strategy consists of estimating the cash flow augmented accelerator
specification in Equation (2), both in the whole sample of firms and in subsamples
Table 2. Median values by subsample: State firms
 
Sample I /K Y /K CF/K D /A E No. of obs.
Overall 0.10 4.16 0.15 0.41 80.00 10,331
1989–93 0.08 4.83 0.16 0.42 44.50 6,195
1994–99 0.13 3.36 0.15 0.40 132.42 4,136
Small firms 0.14 6.56 0.25 0.44 30.50 5,177
Large firms 0.08 3.13 0.11 0.39 251.00 5,154
Low leverage 0.08 3.20 0.16 0.26 92.20 5,166
High leverage 0.14 5.68 0.15 0.62 67.40 5,165
Note : See Section 5 for details on data sources and definitions of variables. I = investment; K = capital; Y =
sales; CF = cash flow; D = total debt; A = total assets; E = employment.
Table 3. Median values by subsample: Private firms
 
Sample I /K Y/K CF/K D /A E No. of obs.
Overall 0.16 5.23 0.23 0.43 71.09 9,949
1989–93 0.10 4.22 0.17 0.33 83.75 2,577
1994–99 0.18 5.63 0.26 0.46 66.06 7,372
Small firms 0.22 6.39 0.29 0.50 46.63 4,985
Large firms 0.11 4.47 0.19 0.36 123.88 4,964
Low leverage 0.09 4.03 0.20 0.26 84.73 4,980
High leverage 0.27 7.07 0.27 0.64 60.67 4,969
Note : See Section 5 for details on data sources and definitions of variables. I = investment; K = capital; Y =
sales; CF = cash flow; D = total debt; A = total assets; E = employment.
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defined by ownership type. We start by examining the relationship between cash
flow and investment in the entire 1989–99 sample period. Next, we focus on how
this relationship changes across the pre-reform and post-reform subsamples,
and perform a number of robustness checks. Finally, in order to obtain a sharper
interpretation of the results, we explore within subperiods differences across
subsamples of firms defined according to size and leverage.
Table 5 presents estimates of the basic accelerator investment equations for the
overall sample (column 2) and by ownership type (columns 3–5). Concerning the
model specification, the diagnostic statistics are generally supportive of the validity
of the instruments. In all equations, the m2 statistic does not reject the hypothesis
of no second-order serial correlation, whereas the m1 statistic indicates significant
(negative) first-order serial correlation. Both results are to be expected if the errors
in levels are serially uncorrelated, which is a necessary condition for t − 2 lags to
be valid instruments. In addition, with the only exception of the equation for the
overall sample, the Sargan test does not reject the validity of the instruments used.
In the overall sample, lagged investment is positive and significant, and the
coefficients for sales are significant and consistent with accelerator effects. A similar
pattern applies to the estimates for the ownership subsamples, with the exception
of the equation for state firms. It is interesting to observe that foreign firms display
the highest investment persistence, with a point estimate for the lagged dependent
variable (0.16) that is close to the ones observed for Western economies in similar
specifications (see, for example, Bond et al., 2003). Both sets of dummies (industry-
and year-specific) are jointly significant in all the equations.
The cash flow coefficient is positive and significant in the overall sample, thus
leading to rejection of the soft budget constraint null hypothesis. In the equations
by ownership, it is interesting to observe that the coefficient for cash flow is lowest
and not significant for state firms, whereas it is positive and significant for both
Table 4. Median values by subsample: Foreign firms
 
Sample I /K Y /K CF/K D/A E No. of obs.
Overall 0.24 3.20 0.25 0.46 109.14 4,922
1989–93 0.25 2.67 0.17 0.43 112.20  796
1994–99 0.24 3.29 0.27 0.46 108.14 4,126
Small firms 0.25 3.33 0.27 0.47 58.50 2,464
Large firms 0.24 3.09 0.24 0.45 261.50 2,458
Low leverage 0.21 2.76 0.29 0.33 111.25 2,465
High leverage 0.27 3.91 0.21 0.61 102.38 2,457
Note : See Section 5 for details on data sources and definitions of variables. I = investment; K = capital; Y =
sales; CF = cash flow; D = total debt; A = total assets; E = employment.
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private and foreign firms. These preliminary findings are therefore consistent with
the hypothesis that, in the whole 1989–99 period, Hungarian state firms faced a
soft budget constraint, whereas private and foreign firms were subject to binding
financial constraints. This hypothesis, however, deserves further investigation.
We therefore move to the analysis of how the investment behaviour of firms
has been affected by financial reforms. We interact the cash flow variable with a
dummy variable (and its complement to 1) that equals 0 up to (and including) 1993
and 1 thereafter, in order to compare the sensitivity of firms’ investment behaviour
before and after financial markets reforms. The choice of 1993 as the cut-off year
for the sample split is based on a number of reasons. First, even though the bank-
ruptcy and banking laws were introduced during 1992, a number of amendments
were made during 1993, such as the elimination of the automatic trigger in the
bankruptcy law. Second, it is reasonable to assume that the new regime displayed
its effects only after some time from the introduction of the new regulations. Third,
the loan consolidation programmes aimed at dealing with the bad debt problem
Table 5. Investment equations: Overall
 
Regressors Overall State Private Foreign
(Ii,t–1/Ki,t–2) 0.100* −0.013 0.131* 0.159*
(7.74) (−0.52) (9.00) (7.37)
(Yi,t/Ki,t–1) −0.009* −0.009* −0.006* −0.011
(−4.21) (−3.19) (−3.18) (−1.80)
(Yi,t–1/Ki,t–2) 0.007* 0.004* 0.008* 0.015*
(6.03) (2.86) (8.85) (3.41)
(CFi,t–1/Ki,t–2) 0.025* 0.003 0.041* 0.039*
(3.41) (0.24) (4.16) (2.78)
m1 (1st order aut.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (2nd order aut.) 0.676 0.868 0.815 0.819
Sargan test 0.000 0.383 0.119 0.998
z1 (overall) 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000
z2 (time dummies) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
z3 (industry dum.) 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.000
No. of obs. 16,536 5,893 7,167 3,476
Notes: Dependent variable: Ii, t/Ki, t−1. GMM one-step estimates in first differences.
Instruments: (t – 2) to (t – 6) lags of I/K, Y/K, CF/K.
Year and industry dummies included in all equations. t-statistics in round brackets (heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors). Asterisks indicate significance at the 5 percent level.
The bottom part of the table reports P-values for the corresponding test statistics.
Sample period: 1991 to 1999. Overall number of firms: 4,333.
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were implemented throughout 1992 and 1993 (see Bonin and Schaffer, 1995).
Finally, at the empirical level, 1993 is preferable to 1992 as it produces subsamples
of similar size (5 and 6 years, respectively).15
The results for the pre- and post-reform subperiods, presented in Table 6, are
revealing. Looking at the overall sample of firms, in the pre-reform period the cash
flow coefficient is close to zero and not significant, whereas in the post-reform
period it is highly significant and about twice as large (0.056) as the corresponding
estimate for the whole period (0.025). This finding seems to suggest that financial
market reforms have indeed hardened budget constraints. The disaggregation by
15 It should be observed that, as shown below, the results reported are robust to the choice of the cut-off year.
Table 6. Investment equations: Pre-post reforms (1993)
 
Regressors Overall State Private Foreign
(Ii,t–1/Ki,t–2) 0.093* −0.016 0.125* 0.158*
(7.11) (−0.61) (8.24) (7.32)
(Yi,t/Ki,t–1) −0.009* −0.009* −0.005* −0.011
(−4.15) (−3.14) (−2.78) (−1.85)
(Yi,t–1/Ki,t–2) 0.007* 0.005* 0.008* 0.015*
(6.09) (2.86) (8.26) (3.38)
(CFi,t–1/Ki,t–2)pre-93 0.002 −0.004 0.006 0.064*
(0.21) (−0.31) (0.32) (2.17)
(CFi,t–1/Ki,t–2)post-93 0.056* 0.035 0.056* 0.037*
(6.61) (1.94) (4.94) (2.53)
(CF/K)post – (CF/K)pre (4.17) (1.77) (2.27) (−0.87)
m1 (1st order aut.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (2nd order aut.) 0.594 0.840 0.691 0.813
Sargan test 0.000 0.422 0.237 0.998
z1 (overall) 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000
z2 (time dummies) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
z3 (industry dummies) 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000
No. of obs. 16,536 5,893 7,167 3,476
Notes : Dependent variable: Ii, t/Ki, t−1. GMM one-step estimates in first differences.
Instruments: (t – 2) to (t – 6) lags of I/K, Y/K, CF/K.
Year and industry dummies included in all equations. t-statistics in round brackets (heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors). Asterisks indicate significance at the 5 percent level.
The bottom part of the table reports P-values for the corresponding test statistics.
Sample period: 1991 to 1999. Overall number of firms: 4,333.
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ownership is also particularly informative. For both state and private firms, the
cash flow coefficient is close to zero and not significant before 1993, but it rises
substantially after 1993. However, for private firms only the sensitivity of invest-
ment to financial conditions becomes strongly significant after 1993, whereas it is
smaller and marginally significant for state firms. Note also that the change in the
coefficients is significant only for private firms. For foreign firms the picture is
quite different: investment is significantly affected by cash flow both before and
after 1993, but the coefficient actually falls in the second period.
On the whole, these results indicate that financial reforms significantly affected
the investment behaviour of all firms, but in different ways depending on the
ownership type. Private firms come to face binding financial constraints in the post-
reform period. State firms appear to keep facing a soft budget constraint, although
their investment decisions become more sensitive to financial conditions. Foreign
firms are subject to a hard budget constraint in both periods, but become less
sensitive to financial conditions, possibly indicating that reforms might have been
successful in lowering informational costs.
In order to verify the validity of these results, we perform a number of robustness
checks. First, we consider the possibility that the changes in cash flow coefficients
across subperiods might be due to differences in sample size: the number of obser-
vations available in the two subperiods is indeed quite different, if we take into
account the fact that two cross-sections are lost at the beginning of the sample
(1989–90) because of differencing and taking lags. We therefore consider an
alternative definition of pre- and post-reform periods, selecting 1995 as the threshold
year. This implies that the effective subperiods contain 5 and 4 cross-sections,
respectively. The results, presented in Table 7, confirm and qualify those presented
in Table 6 for the 1993 sample split: the cash flow coefficient is not significant
throughout the sample period for state firms, it rises significantly after 1995 for
private firms and, for foreign firms, it falls over time and is actually significant
before 1995 but not significant thereafter.16
Second, we investigate the robustness of the results with respect to the choice
of the instrument set. This is a particularly important issue in the present context,
given that the sample split for the cash flow variable implies that less moment
conditions are available for the first period than for the second period.17 We
therefore also present estimates obtained using instruments dated t − 2 and t − 3,
so that the number of moment conditions is (almost) the same for each cross-section
16 The results for private and foreign firms are consistent with those presented in Table 3, given the different
subsample definition: as 1994 and 1995 are now part of the pre-reform period, cash flow becomes significant
in the first subsample for private firms and not significant for foreign firms in the second subsample.
17 In particular, for t = 89, . . . , 99, if the instruments are dated t − 2, to t − 6, the cross-sections available
as instruments are CF89 for ∆CF91, CF89 to CF90 for ∆CF92, CF89 to CF91 for ∆CF93, and so on until CF93 to CF97
for ∆CF99.
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before and after the threshold year.18 Table 8 reports the coefficients for cash flow,
considering either 1993 or 1995 as threshold dates for the sample split. The esti-
mates are very close to the ones presented in Tables 6 and 7 for all specifications.
The parameters are estimated less precisely, as expected, using the smaller instru-
ment set, resulting in lower t-statistics. However, all the results for the role of cash
flow in the two periods are robust to use of the smaller instrument set. This indi-
cates that the results presented in Tables 6 and 7 are not affected by the smaller
number of moment conditions available for the first period.
18 Indeed, the first period still has one less instrument than the second since only one instrument (CF89) is
available for 1991.
Table 7. Investment equations: Pre-post reforms (1995)
 
Regressors Overall State Private Foreign
(Ii,t–1/Ki,t–2) 0.098* −0.013 0.130* 0.156*
(7.58) (−0.53) (8.88) (7.27)
(Yi,t/Ki,t–1) −0.009* −0.009* −0.005* −0.012
(−4.18) (−3.15) (−2.94) (−1.91)
(Yi,t–1/Ki,t–2) 0.007* 0.005* 0.008* 0.015*
(6.05) (2.82) (8.67) (3.38)
(CFi,t–1/Ki,t–2)pre-95 0.015 −0.001 0.028* 0.071*
(1.53) (−0.07) (2.14) (3.67)
(CFi,t–1/Ki,t–2)post-95 0.050* 0.026 0.056* 0.028
(5.04) (1.29) (4.22) (1.71)
(CF/K)post – (CF/K)pre (2.69) (1.19) (1.55) (1.82)
m1 (1st order aut.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (2nd order aut.) 0.730 0.853 0.840 0.710
Sargan test 0.000 0.387 0.151 0.999
z1 (overall) 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000
z2 (time dummies) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
z3 (industry dummies) 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.000
No. of obs. 16,536 5,893 7,167 3,476
Note : Dependent variable: Ii, t/Ki, t−1. GMM one-step estimates in first differences.
Instruments: (t – 2) to (t – 6) lags of I/K, Y/K, CF/K.
Year and industry dummies included in all equations. t-statistics in round brackets (heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors). Asterisks indicate significance at the 5 percent level.
The bottom part of the table reports P-values for the corresponding test statistics.
Sample period: 1991 to 1999. Overall number of firms: 4,333.
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A further robustness check is necessary in order to consider the possibility that,
due to the high turnover of firms in the overall sample, the differences in the
estimated cash flow coefficients before and after 1993 might actually reflect the
different composition of the subsamples. We therefore estimate the investment
equations on a balanced sample containing only firms that are present throughout
the 1989–99 period. The results, presented in Table 9, indicate that the effect of
financial liberalization on investment behaviour is not spurious: cash flow coeffi-
cients rise and become statistically significant in the post-reform period, both in the
overall sample and in the ownership disaggregation, with the only exception of
foreign-owned firms.19
One potential problem with testing the role of financial constraints using liquidity
indicators such as cash flow is that these variables may be capturing the effect of
other determinants, such as expectations about the profitability of investment
projects, to the extent that they are not already captured by sales. The solution
generally adopted in the literature relies on firms’ cross-sectional heterogeneity,
19 It should be observed, however, that in the balanced sample the number of observations for state and
foreign firms is quite low (117 and 459, respectively), so that the results of the corresponding equations
should be interpreted with care.
Table 8. Investment equations: Instruments dated t – 2, t – 3
 
Regressors Overall State Private Foreign
(CFi,t–1/Ki,t–2)pre-93 0.002 −0.001 0.004 0.059
(0.16) (−0.07) (0.21) (1.47)
(CFi,t–1/Ki,t–2)pre-93 0.055* 0.029 0.055* 0.029
(6.39) (1.61) (4.70) (1.85)
(CFi,t–1/Ki,t–2)pre-95 0.012 0.001 0.023 0.060*
(1.17) (0.07) (1.73) (2.78)
(CFi,t–1/Ki,t–2)pre-95 0.053* 0.022 0.060* 0.021
(5.33) (1.10) (4.34) (1.18)
(CF/K)post-93 – (CF/K)pre-93 (4.03) (1.38) (2.29) (−0.72)
(CF/K)post-95 – (CF/K)pre-95 (3.10) (0.90) (1.99) (−1.47)
Number of observations 16,536 5,893 7,167 3,476
Note: Dependent variable: Ii, t/Ki, t−1. GMM one-step estimates in first differences.
Instruments: (t – 2) to (t – 3) lags of I/K, Y/K, CF/K.
Year and industry dummies included in all equations. t-statistics in round brackets (heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors). Asterisks indicate significance at the 5 percent level.
The bottom part of the table reports P-values for the corresponding test statistics.
Sample period: 1991 to 1999. Overall number of firms: 4,333.
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exploiting the fact that the sensitivity of investment spending to changes in financial
positions should be higher for firms believed to face significant agency costs.20
Empirical studies of investment behaviour thus usually split the sample into
groups according to a number of criteria considered a priori to identify financially
constrained firms, including dividend policy, age, size, industrial group, bond
rating, stock listing, and ownership structure.
20 An alternative solution is to assume that investment opportunities are captured by the Q ratio (see, e.g.,
Blundell et al., 1992; Hayashi and Inoue, 1991; Schaller, 1990). However, apart from the practical consideration
that the construction of Tobin’s Q ratio is substantially more data demanding, it is difficult to determine the
extent to which an average estimate of Q actually reflects expected profitability.
Table 9. Investment equations: Pre-post 1993 (balanced sample)
 
Regressors Overall State Private Foreign
(Ii,t–1/Ki,t–2) 0.031 −0.232 −0.004 0.158*
(1.24) (−1.39) (−0.01) (2.62)
(Yi,t/Ki,t–1) −0.002 −0.003* −0.008* −0.007
(−0.04) (−3.76) (−4.65) (−1.37)
(Yi,t–1/Ki,t–2) 0.002 −0.004 0.009* 0.022*
(0.40) (−0.25) (2.76) (2.79)
(CFi,t–1/Ki,t–2)pre-93 0.053 0.029 0.062 0.012
(1.63) (0.90) (1.86) (0.10)
(CFi,t–1/Ki,t–2)post-93 0.112* 0.114* 0.086* 0.048
(5.24) (3.39) (3.87) (1.47)
(CF/K)post-93 – (CF/K)pre-93 (2.15) (3.87) (1.23) (1.07)
m1 (1st order aut.) 0.000 0.098 0.002 0.001
m2 (2nd order aut.) 0.162 0.188 0.423 0.757
Sargan test 0.643 0.942 0.451 1.000
z1 (overall) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
z2 (time dummies) 0.001 0.032 0.001 0.110
z3 (industry dummies) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of obs. 2,403 117 1,827 459
Notes : Dependent variable: Ii, t/Ki, t−1. GMM one-step estimates in first differences.
Instruments: (t – 2) to (t – 6) lags of I/K, Y/K, CF/K.
Year and industry dummies included in all equations. t-statistics in round brackets (heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors). Asterisks indicate significance at the 5 percent level.
The bottom part of the table reports P-values for the corresponding test statistics.
Sample period: 1991 to 1999. Overall number of firms: 267.
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We follow a similar approach in order to control for the possibility that the
different sensitivity of investment to cash flow before and after the reforms might
be reflecting a change in the unobserved determinants of investment demand, such
as expected profitability. We therefore present estimates obtained with a further
disaggregation, within the pre- and post-reform subsamples, according to firm
size and solvency, respectively. Similarly to the case of informational problems in
market economies, size can be expected to matter for budget constraints in a transition
economy. Large firms are more likely to face a soft budget constraint, as there are
stronger social and political pressures to grant them external support in case of
financial difficulties. Because of their influence, large firms are more likely to have
access to external assistance by means of direct subsidies or bail-out credits.21 As
a consequence, an insignificant cash flow coefficient for large firms can be
interpreted as an indication of soft budget constraints, rather than efficient capital
markets (see, for example, Lízal and Svejnar, 2002, and Budina et al., 2000). On
the other hand, leverage, measured by the debt–asset ratio (non-equity assets
over total assets), is not expected to be related to the tightness of the budget
constraint.22
The results for the disaggregation by size, presented in Table 10, are quite
interesting: in the post-reform period cash flow is positive and significant only
for small firms. Looking at the results by ownership type, cash flow is significant
for small private firms and (marginally) for small state and foreign firms. This
indicates that the hardening of the budget constraint following financial market
reforms only affected small private firms and, to a lesser extent, small state firms.
Large firms, on the contrary, were largely unaffected irrespective of their ownership
type.
The results for the disaggregation by solvency (based on the debt–asset ratio),
presented in Table 11, indicate that in the post-reform period the sensitivity of
investment to financial conditions is higher and significant for low-leverage firms.
However, if we consider the equations by ownership, the significance of the
estimated relationship is not related to leverage: in the post-reform period cash
flow does not affect investment levels of state firms, whereas it does affect those of
private and (marginally) foreign firms, irrespective of their debt levels. This result
is consistent with the hypothesis that the budget constraints of small private and
state-owned firms became more binding after the introduction of financial reforms,
given that leverage, differently from size, is not expected a priori to be related to
the tightness of the budget constraint.
21 ‘There is a peculiar disparity in the treatment of large and small state-owned firms. [ . . . ] Large firms are
much more successful in lobbying for favours, particularly for investment resources. Some of them are in
great financial trouble; nevertheless large credits or subsidies are granted to them’ (Kornai, 2000, p. 29).
22 The sample split is obtained by allowing the cash flow coefficient to take different values in the two
subsamples, by interacting cash flow with the appropriate dummy variable.
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7. Concluding remarks
This paper presented an empirical investigation of the investment behaviour of a
large panel of Hungarian manufacturing and construction firms in the period from
1989 to 1999. We examined the role of financial factors for corporate investment
Table 10. Investment equations: Disaggregation by size
 
Regressors Overall State Private Foreign
(Ii,t–1/Ki,t–2) 0.037* −0.029 0.094* 0.157*
(2.35) (−1.07) (5.32) (7.03)
(Yi,t/Ki,t–1) −0.010* −0.008* −0.005* −0.012
(−4.58) (−3.05) (−2.88) (−1.92)
(Yi,t–1/Ki,t–2) 0.005* 0.004* 0.007* 0.014*
(4.65) (2.73) (7.08) (3.48)
−0.105 −0.281 −0.063 0.125
(−0.62) (−1.64) (−1.10) (1.84)
0.007 0.007 0.020 0.033
(0.42) (0.45) (0.58) (0.82)
0.031 −0.016 0.029 −0.010
(0.70) (−0.38) (0.75) (−0.12)
0.045* 0.069 0.059* 0.049
(2.09) (1.82) (3.24) (1.77)
(0.81) (1.52) (1.47) (−1.21)
(1.56) (1.55) (1.06) (0.39)
m1 (1st order aut.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (2nd order aut.) 0.010 0.249 0.681 0.798
Sargan test 0.016 0.847 0.431 0.997
z1 (overall) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
z2 (time dummies) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006
z3 (industry dummies) 0.002 0.009 0.021 0.007
No. of obs. 16,536 5,893 7,167 3,476
Notes: Dependent variable: Ii, t/Ki, t−1. GMM one-step estimates in first differences.
Instruments: (t – 2) to (t – 6) lags of I/K, Y/K, CF/K.
Year and industry dummies included in all equations. t-statistics in round brackets (heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors). Asterisks indicate significance at the 5 percent level.
The bottom part of the table reports P-values for the corresponding test statistics.
Sample period: 1991 to 1999. Overall number of firms: 4,333.
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decisions by ownership type before and after the introduction of major financial
reforms, and explored differences across subsamples of firms defined according to
size and leverage.
Our results indicate that financial reforms have significantly affected the investment
behaviour of Hungarian firms. The effects, however, were different depending
on firms’ ownership. Both state-owned and domestic private firms faced a soft
budget constraint before 1993. In the post-reform period, however, while private
Table 11. Investment equations: Disaggregation by leverage
 
Regressors Overall State Private Foreign
(Ii,t–1/Ki,t–2) 0.040* −0.028 0.089* 0.139*
(2.52) (−0.98) (4.81) (6.28)
(Yi,t/Ki,t–1) −0.010* −0.010* −0.006* −0.010
(−4.95) (−3.52) (−3.81) (−1.79)
(Yi,t – 1/Ki,t–2) 0.005* 0.004* 0.007* 0.012*
(4.41) (2.13) (7.35) (3.49)
0.053 −0.106 0.033 0.033
(0.60) (−0.77) (0.39) (0.48)
−0.016 0.051 −0.001 0.093
(−0.38) (0.87) (−0.02) (1.12)
0.212* 0.150 0.113* 0.073*
(2.99) (1.36) (2.35) (2.58)
0.030 0.031 0.047* 0.044
(1.34) (0.99) (2.48) (1.87)
(1.36) (1.47) (0.87) (0.59)
(0.96) (−0.29) (1.11) (−0.55)
m1 (1st order aut.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (2nd order aut.) 0.468 0.579 0.339 0.825
Sargan test 0.000 0.787 0.300 0.999
z1 (overall) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
z2 (time dummies) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006
z3 (industry dummies) 0.000 0.119 0.050 0.001
No. of obs. 16,536 5,893 7,167 3,476
Notes : Dependent variable: Ii, t/Ki, t−1. GMM one-step estimates in first differences.
Instruments: (t – 2) to (t – 6) lags of I/K, Y/K, CF/K.
Year and industry dummies included in all equations. t-statistics in round brackets (heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors). Asterisks indicate significance at the 5 percent level.
The bottom part of the table reports P-values for the corresponding test statistics.
Sample period: 1991 to 1999. Overall number of firms: 4,333.
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firms came to face binding financial constraints, state-owned firms remained
subject to a soft budget constraint, although their investment decisions became more
sensitive to financial conditions. The response of foreign-owned firms was quite
different: they were subject to a hard budget constraint in both periods, but became
less sensitive to financial conditions, possibly indicating that reforms have been
successful in lowering informational costs. These results were found to be robust
to a number of consistency checks.
Splitting the sample further by size and leverage, we found that in the post-
1993 period budget constraints have become binding for small private firms and,
to a lesser extent, small state firms. Large firms, on the contrary, continued to face
a soft budget constraint irrespective of their ownership type. The fact that the post-
1993 relationship between financial conditions and investment for Hungarian
domestic firms depends on size but not on leverage can be taken as a further
indication that financial reforms displayed their effects through the hardening of
the budget constraint for small private and state firms.
Overall, our results extend and qualify those obtained by previous studies for
Hungary and other transition economies. On the one hand, the persistent absence
of liquidity constraints suggests that, despite the introduction of major financial
reforms, large state-owned firms operated under a soft budget constraint throughout
the 1990s. This result is consistent with the findings of Lízal and Svejnar (2002) for
the Czech Republic and Budina et al. (2000) for Bulgaria.
On the other hand, financial reforms seem to have significantly improved the
efficiency of credit allocation to the private sector in at least two respects: budget
constraints became binding for private domestic firms, particularly small ones, and
informational costs became less relevant for foreign-owned firms. This finding,
based on a sample of firms representing about 80 percent of total Hungarian
manufacturing employment and value added, confirms and extends the results
obtained by Perotti and Vesnaver (2004) for the period from 1992 to 1998.23 Future
research will determine whether the further transformation of the financial sector
will allow the imposition of hard budget constraints on Hungarian firms irrespective
of their ownership type.
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Appendix 1
The dataset
The dataset used in this paper contains company account data for a large cross-
section of Hungarian firms observed from 1989 to 1999. The dataset is based on
two sources: a dataset collected by the Hungarian Ministry of Finance that contains
information on all firms that paid corporate or profit taxes from 1989 to 1996,
covering the majority of Hungarian firms; and a second dataset from the Hungarian
Central Statistical Office that contains end of year financial statements of medium
and large firms, from 1992 to 1999. Merging the information from the two sources
we obtained firm-level annual time series between 1989 and 1999 for balance sheet
and income statement variables, plus information on ownership, employment,
export, regional location and industry identification at the four-digit level.
Firms are identified by their identification numbers. It should be observed that
when a firm is split, due to restructuring or privatization, a branch or a part of it
normally keeps the same identification number of the original firm, while a different
identification number is assigned to the other parts or branches. Although the
original firm and the branch that keeps the same identification number are de facto
different firms, in the sample they are recorded as the same firm.
The dataset can be considered highly representative of the overall Hungarian
economy. Table A1 provides some information on the sample coverage by report-
ing total employment and value added in the sample as a percentage of the whole
economy. The firms contained in the sample account for 78 percent and over 80
percent of total employment and value added respectively in the manufacturing
sector. In other sectors such as agriculture and services the degree of representa-
tiveness is lower, reflecting the higher number of small firms.
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Table A1. Sample coverage
 
Sector Employment Value added
Agriculture 37.2 27.3
Mining 41.0 82.7
Manufacturing 78.0 81.2
Electricity, Gas, Water 93.8 97.0
Construction 36.1 34.3
Trade, Tourism 35.8 40.3
Transport 72.1 58.9
Finance 29.8 9.4
Public Administration 4.3 4.7
Note: Total employment and value added in the sample as a percentage of the Hungarian economy (1995).
Table A2. Sample representativeness by size
 
Size class Dataset Whole economy
0–10 13.6 75.5
11–20 5.0 12.0
21–50 21.2 7.0
51–300 49.4 4.5
300– 10.8 1.0
Note : Distribution of employment by employment size class (1995).
Table A3. Sample representativeness by sector
 
Sector Dataset Whole economy
Agriculture 7.6 8.0
Mining 1.0 0.9
Manufacturing 43.0 23.1
Electricity, Gas, Water 6.3 2.6
Construction 5.4 5.9
Trade, Tourism 14.2 15.6
Transport 15.9 8.7
Finance 4.4 6.0
Public Administration 2.2 29.2
Note : Distribution of employment by sector (1995).
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If we consider size representativeness, medium and large firms are over-
represented in the dataset compared to the overall economy. As shown in Table A2,
firms in the smallest size class (0–10 employees) account for over two thirds of the
total number of firms in the Hungarian economy, whereas in our dataset they
account for only 13.6 percent of the total. Looking at the distribution by sector,
Table A3 shows that the manufacturing sector is over-represented (43 percent,
against 23.1 percent in the whole economy).
Appendix 2
The accelerator model
In the accelerator model, investment is determined by setting the marginal product
of capital equal to marginal cost. For a given technology, the optimal level of the
capital stock can be obtained, and investment fills the gap between the optimal and
current capital stock. Under a number of simplifying assumptions, the demand for
capital can be expressed as a function of the level of output and the user cost of
capital. Formally, the model can be derived from firms’ maximization of profit (see
Cho, 1996):
(A1)
subject to
Kt+i = (1 − δ)Kt+i−1 + It+i (A2)
where β is the discount rate, p the price of output, K the capital stock, L the
labour input, w the wage rate, I is gross investment, pI the price of investment
goods, and δ the rate of depreciation. The first-order condition for the capital stock
implies that
(A3)
where J is the user cost of capital, r the nominal rate of return and π I the inflation
rate for investment goods. Intuitively, at the optimum capital stock, the marginal
product of capital equals the cost of using an additional unit of capital.
If the production function has constant elasticity of substitution (CES):
(A4)
then
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FK = αY (1−ρ )K (ρ−1) (A5)
so that the first-order condition implies
(A6)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. This gives the
desired stock of capital as a function of sales and the user cost of capital. Investment
decisions should be aimed at achieving this optimal level of capital.
If the production function is Cobb-Douglas (σ = 1), we obtain
(A7)
Under the further assumption that there is no substitution between capital and
labour (σ = 0), or that Jt is constant,24 then
(A8)
Investment is then given by
I t = αYt − (1 − δ)Kt−1 (A9)
and dividing by Kt − 1 we obtain an accelerator investment model, where investment
is not affected by the user cost of capital:
(A10)
This equilibrium relationship can be modified to account for gradual adjustment
of the actual capital stock to the desired capital stock (changes in output):
(A11)
(see, for example, Fazzari et al., 1988). To test for the presence of financial constraints
this basic specification can be augmented with lagged cash flow (as a ratio of the
capital stock).
24 Alternatively, it can be assumed that the variation in the user cost of capital is captured by time-specific
or firm-specific effects in the error term.
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